Michigan Law Review
Volume 87

Issue 6

1989

Constitutional Conventions
Frederick Schauer
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Conventions, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1407 (1989).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol87/iss6/19

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
Frederick Schauer*

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw. Second Edition. By Laurence
H. Tribe. Mineola, New York: The Foundation Press. 1988. Pp. civ,
1778. $38.95.
I

Under normal circumstances, publication of the second edition of
a book about constitutional law, even as important a work as this one,
would not merit a review. But Laurence Tribe's American Constitutional Law, published in its first edition in 1978, is different. That difference is not so much a function of the way in which this book
diverges in quality or even in content from others. Rather, it arises
from the very role American Constitutional Law plays in the field of
constitutional law. When we look at that role, we learn a great deal
about the nature of the subject that is constitutional law, and also
about the nature of the academic discipline that takes that subject as
its focus.
Making sense out of what I have just suggested requires drawing a
distinction between works that are part of a subject and works that
comment on that subject. At times works that are part of a subject are
of such seminal importance that they have in essence created those
subjects. Consider in this regard the writings of Marx or Freud, or
indeed almost all literature. To think of the writings of Shakespeare,
Milton, Zola, Austen, or Dreiser as about literature misses the point,
for they are literature in just the same way that the Grand Canyon is
geology, pythons are herpetology, the acts of George Washington and
Queen Victoria are history, and the decisions of Margaret Thatcher
and Yasir Arafat are politics.
Things get tricky, however, for three reasons. First, we often use
the same word to describe both the subject and the discipline that
studies it. Government is the name both for what George Bush does
for a living and for a department· at Harvard University. Economics
encompasses both the pricing decisions of General Motors and the activities of those in university departments who analyze those decisions.
History is both what happens and the discipline of interpreting and
analyzing what has happened. Still, this may be little more than lin• Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan. A.B. 1967,
M.B.A. 1968, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1972, Harvard. - Ed.

1407

1408

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 87:1407

guistic happenstance. George Bush may be a governor but he is not a
political scientist, any more than Dred Scott, a historical figure, was a
historian. Is my mental behavior psychology, or is psychology what
psychologists study? Here (and perhaps so too with sociology) the linguistic evidence is ambiguous, but my point is only that we ought not
to let verbal similarities obscure recognition of a tolerably useful distinction between the process of investigation and the subject of that
investigation.
Second, it is sometimes the case that the subject of the discipline
takes on the role of investigator or commentator, and frequently uses
the discipline itself as the vehicle for that commentary. Here the perspective is one that is often referred to as "modernist," and it involves
the way in which the painting· of Rene Magritte and the sculpture of
George Segal and the architecture of Philip Johnson are simultaneously painting, sculpture, and architecture and commentary on painting, sculpture, and architecture. But the role of the participant as
commentator is merely a contingent feature of some perspectives on
some disciplines. Again the distinctions have fuzzy edges, but art that
is self-critical about art is different from art that takes something other
than art to be its subject. In some way the frescoes of Diego Rivera
and Jose Clemente Orozco ar~ about art, but they are also and more
directly about politics and economics. Thus, although sometimes the
subject of a discipline takes on· the role of self-conscious critic, this
need not always be the case.
Finally, and most relevantly, ~he subject of the discipline may at
times be a book. This is most obvious when the subject is literature,
but we see the same phenomenon when we consider, now, the role of
The Federalist, Mein Kampf, Das Kapital, or The Wealth of Nations.
Books like these occupy a position in history or political science or
economics not dissimilar to that occupied by flounder in ichthyology.
That books may be the object of investigation rather than merely the
medium of investigation is most relevant, of course, because words,
usually but not always inscribed in books, are the stuff of the law, the
discipline which it is the role of the legal scholar to study.
The distinction between words as subject and words as commentary is especially obvious when we consider canonical rules such as
those found in statutes, regulations, and written constitutions. The
Uniform Commercial Code, while of course saying something about
law by its very being, is still primarily an item of, rather than regarding, law. Much the same could be said about judicial opinions. Those
opinions are most important in their roles as raw material, as the law
itself, as partly constitutive of law - just as rocks are partly constitutive of geology.
From this perspective, the legal treatise is an interesting phenomenon. At some level it is about law, but much more significantly it too
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is law. The treatise is something that participants in the system, such
as lawyers and judges, use; it is something that aims to and frequently
does influence the development of the law itself; and it is something
that on occasion takes on a status equivalent to or more important
than some of the more obvious primary legal items. Wigmore on Evidence and Corbin on Contracts are far more significant legal items than
many cases. Compared to most judicial opinions, they are used more
often by participants within the system, they have had a greater influence on the current state of the law, and their citation is likely to be
more persuasive in most adjudicative contexts. To understand a particular treatise, therefore, requires that we first understand the role of
treatises in general in the legal culture.
II

In constitutional law, a pervasive phenomenon has impeded our
ability to see the distinction I am attempting to draw. The phenomenon to which I refer is the overwhelming normativity of constitutional
scholarship. With monotonous regularity, law review articles attempt
to speak to courts deciding today's legal issues, in the hope that some
legal actor, such as a lawyer, will refer to the article in a legal argument and persuade some judge (or, more likely, law clerk) to adopt the
conclusions and analysis the article advocates. When this happens,
and the article is then cited, the article itself becomes part of the primary legal material. It also reinforces a decisionmaking perspective
in which that type of material continues to be treated as primary
source.
I am not troubled by this type of constitutional scholarship, and
indeed have done some myself. Legal academics have every right in
the world to whisper in courts' ears if they want to, and there is no
reason that this variety of scholarship should be denigrated. I am concerned, however, about the virtual exclusivity of this mode. "Mere"
description, explanation, interpretation, or analysis, no matter how insightful, rich, imaginative, or informative, is hardly the preferred
mode of constitutional scholarship. Rather, the normative mode so
pervades that scholarship - whether through doctrine (the Supreme
Court should recognize the constitutional rights of a's to x) or grand
theory (the Supreme Court should base its decisions on original intent/moral values/text/context/human rights/political expediencyI
precedent/deference to legislative choice/popular will) - that the
mode seems essentially to characterize the discipline.
One consequence of this conflation of the scholarly with the normative is that it is far too easy to evaluate what is plainly a primary
work by the standards we would use to evaluate work that seeks to
explain an enterprise rather than participate in it. When we lose sight
of the fact that scholarship need not aspire to make short- or even
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intermediate-term changes in the phenomenon it is studying (How
often do historians make history?), we tend to evaluate scholarship too
much by its actual or potential impact on constitutional actors. But
conversely, to lose sight of the distinction would be to expect of a primary item that which we should expect only in a quite different kind
of secondary scholarly analysis.

III
As all of the foregoing should make clear, I think it is important to
view American Constitutional Law as an item of constitutional law
rather than as commentary upon that field. In part this is a function of
the way in which treatises have always been centrally important items
of American law, from Blackstone to Story to Cooley to Corbin to
Williston to Pomeroy to Wigmore to Scott to Prosser to Davis to Loss,
and so on. I Now it may be that constitutional decisionmaking in the
Supreme Court is sufficiently political and sufficiently legally indeterminate that the idea of a legal treatise about all or part of that process
would be questionable. Just as a legal treatise directed to Congress as
it considers which legislation to adopt would seem a bit odd, a legal
treatise directed to the Supreme Court as it decides constitutional
cases would be open to a powerful (even if not ultimately persuasive)
Realist attack. 2
But only the most crabbed view of the subject would see constitutional law as solely, or even largely, about how the Supreme Court of
the United States decides a mere 155 cases a year. Once we comprehend the tens of thousands (at least) of court cases a year involving
constitutional issues, to say nothing of the far larger number of legal
events in which the Constitution plays a role, it is plain that constitutional law is every bit as treatise-worthy as trusts, evidence, securities
regulation, equity, or agency. Professor Tribe recognizes this phenomenon, and addresses it at the outset of this book. He is properly conscious of the fact that the Constitution speaks not only to, and perhaps
not even primarily to, the federal judiciary, but "addresses its commands ... to all public authorities in the United States" (p. 16). If we
expect those authorities to treat both the text of the Constitution and
judicial opinions interpreting that text as law, ot at least as a set of
rules that constrain them, then treatises about the constitutional text
as interpreted by the courts would seem to be an indispensable part of
the subject. Moreover, since most judicial constitutional decisions are
1. See also??? F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY (1976).
2. Note that I refer here to the process of Supreme Court decisionmaking and not to the
output of that process. To think Realistically about the way the Supreme Court makes decisions,
especially in constitutional cases, is hardly to deny the rule-based doctrinal effect of its decisions,
any more than to think of Congress as a political body is to deny that the legislation it enacts is,
and is treated as, law in a decidedly non-Realist sense.
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not made by the Supreme Court, but by courts we commonly expect to
treat the output of the Supreme Court as constraining, then once again
books about that output that are directed in part to those who are
expected to follow it would seem to be an essential part of the institution of constitutional law.
Of course there are treatises and there are treatises. Some are
merely descriptive, taking their task to be one of organizing, cataloging, and summarizing the law in order to make it accessible to a wide
variety of users. 3 Other treatises perform this largely descriptive task
but do something more as well, offering interstitial commentary, critique, and normative suggestions about where the law, at the margin,
ought to be going. And still others, while providing both description
and interstitial prescription, also offer a broad-based critique of and
pressure on existing doctrine, seeking not only to organize the field but
to make major changes in it. This last-described style is hardly new,
and part of the reason that Story, Corbin, Wigmore, and others have
achieved their eminence is precisely that they did far more than collect
and describe, and were hardly neutral as to important issues, large and
small, within the fields in which they wrote.
"Tribe on Constitutional Law" falls plainly in this last mold.
Although the book is perhaps a bit more disjointed than the first edition (not itself a grounds for criticism, for it is a mistake to try to ·
impose more order on a subject than the nature of the subject permits),
it is plainly a book with persuasive but controversial themes. Let me
offer a few examples.
Perhaps the most pervasive example is Tribe's explicitly articulated
and defended decision not to concern himself with issues of judicial
legitimacy (pp. 12-17). In part this is a function of his laudable distinction between constitutional law and constitutional decisionmaking
by the courts, for once we subtract the latter from the former, questions about judicial legitimacy are largely beside the point.4 But his
decision to treat questions of legitimacy as essentially settled embodies
a quite activist view even about contemporary constitutional decisionmaking. Given that every judicial decision is a decision not only of
substantive law, but of that decisionmaker's authority to decide cases
of that kind, 5 and given that the courts are incessantly deciding cases
3. The current norms of legal scholarship make it advisable not to cite any examples of this
genre.
4. They are not quite as beside the point as Tribe makes them out to be in introducing this
theme. Given his CQncem for constitutional decisionmaking by nonjudicial actors, his discussion
of Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), pp. 32-42, takes on a special prominence, as reflected by
the recently controversial issue of how nonjudicial actors should look upon judicial opinions
interpreting constitutional questions. See generally Meese, Neubome, Lee, Tushnet, Nagel,
Colby, Levinson, Stick & Clark, Perspectives on the Authoritativeness ofSupreme Court Decisions,
61 TUL. L. REV. 977-1095 (1987).
5. See 'Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's Balancing
Test, 16 HARV. L. REv. 755 (1963).
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not identical to ones they have decided before, issues of decisionmaking jurisdiction logically can never be off the agenda. To so regard
them is implicitly to assume jurisdiction despite the logical and frequently legal plausibility of deciding against the exercise of that jurisdiction. 6 Thus, it is not that Tribe does not deal with issues of judicial
legitimacy. It is rather that assertion and defense of that legitimacy is
a running theme of the book.
The devotion of an entire chapter to "Rights of Privacy and Personhood" (pp. 1302-435) is an equally prominent example of Tribe's
willingness to take sides on fundamental and contested questions of
constitutional law. Although troubled by the abortion decisions, he
ultimately finds their basic aim correct (pp. 1337-62), and endorses
strong judicial protection for the rights to realize a chosen vocation
(pp. 1373-78), to determine one's appearance (pp. 1384-89), to control
information about one's life (pp. 1389-400), and to engage in private
sexual associations (pp. 1421-35). By contrast, he is skeptical about
constitutionalizing the topic of death and dying (pp. 1362-71), and
more skeptical about constitutionalizing risk-taking (pp. 1371-73) than
he was in the first edition. 7 Thus, although Tribe admirably does not
sign on reflexively to every claim that has been made for constitutional
protection in the name of personhood, it is plain that he finds the foundations for many such arguments to be sound.
In the area ofequal protection, Tribe would have the courts, contrary to existing law, examine a wide range of governmental acts that
have a discriminatory effect (pp. 1502-14), and have them examine age
and disability discrimination much more closely than is now the case
(pp. 1588-601). In support of these conclusions, he offers a broadbased theory of subjugation (pp. 1514-21) as a way of distinguishing
classifications that are constitutionally troublesome from those that
are not.
Although Tribe's views can often be seen as exerting pressure on
current constitutional doctrine, at other times he endorses the existing
state of the law. For example, he remains unsympathetic to any signif6. For example, Tribe endorses rational basis scrutiny for all legislation, pp. 581-86, 1439-51;
urges at least some scrutiny of laws having a discriminatory effect but no discriminatory intent,
pp. 1502-14; approves of some first amendment scrutiny for restrictions on commercial advertising, pp. 890-904; and is comfortable with a rather particularistic examination of a wide range of
state laws that may affect interstate commerce, pp. 408-41. Every one of these conclusions could
have been otherwise without jeopardizing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1Cranch)137 (1803), or
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), and thus every one of these conclusions involves the rejection of the view that it' would be unwise in a majoritarian system for the
courts to be as intrusive in reviewing legislation as each of these doctrines allows. I have no
quarrel with Tribe's rejection, but I do quarrel with the implicit argument that we can easily
separate what the courts should do with whether they should do anything. Thus, my objection is
to Tribe's descriptive claim that he does not stress issues of legitimacy in the book. Issues of
legitimacy pervade every page, for they are embedded in most constitutional decisions and in
Tribe's conclusions about them.
7. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 938-41 (1978).
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icant constitutional scrutiny for government speech, finding the existing nonscrutiny preferable to the arguments of those who would
have it otherwise (pp. 804-14). Similarly, he comes down tentatively
in favor of the unconstitutionality of the Indianapolis anti-pornography ordinance, 8 resists efforts to expand greatly the existing degree of
scrutiny under the Takings Clause (pp. 588-607), and is comfortable
with the current expansiveness of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. 9
Obviously it is not my aim to provide a survey of every position
Tribe takes or to analyze the relationship between his positions and
existing doctrine. I offer these examples only to show that on virtually
every issue Tribe discusses, he has a normative posture. Sometimes
that posture is stronger than at others, sometimes it is consistent with
existing law and sometimes not, but Tribe is never a passive describer.
Tribe the commentator, Tribe the evaluator, and Tribe the advocate
are constant presences throughout the book.

IV
Given that Tribe is constantly speaking to and attempting to persuade the reader, it is interesting to examine the voice with which he
speaks, and, relatedly, the reader to whom he appears to be speaking.
The questions of voice and audience, however, are intimately tied to
this book's role as internal to the enterprise of constitutional law. In
part the book speaks to those who are somewhat receptive to its arguments, in the hope that they will become more receptive and take the
book as authoritative support for views that may have existed, albeit
inchoately, prior to hearing what Tribe has to say. The book plainly
will not persuade Chief Justice Rehnquist to embrace a wide variety of
rights emanating from the concept of personhood. On the other hand,
it may partly persuade, and, more significantly, warrant, other Justices
to embody some views of constitutional doctrine they may already
have. If I am right about this book's authoritative status, then "Private sexual association is protected. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1421-35 (1988)" is a better citation than "Private sexual
association is protected," and as a result there may be some cases in
which Justices inclined to this view will embody it if they can say the
former but not if they can say only the latter.
This is of course too crude a causal model. More realistically,
sources embark on a journey toward authoritativeness first by being
8. Pp. 921-28. Interestingly, however, he appears, equally tentatively, to be sympathetic to
some narrowly drawn damage awards on behalf of those who suffered psychic trauma as a result
of events such as the march of the Nazis in Skokie. P. 856.
9. Pp. 305-17. However, Tribe appears to extract more of a requirement of a clear statement
on the part of Congress, pp. 316-17, than a few cases in the criminal law area would seem to me
to justify.
·
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mentioned in a comparatively superfluous way. But once they are
mentioned, even if it is only in passing, they begin to take on an authority that may, over a long enough period, be more ·meaningfully
incorporated into some number of judicial opinions, even determining
the result in some. 10 To put it differently, books like Tribe's may make
arguments permissible that previously were impermissible.1 1 For
some time those arguments may lose, but as legitimate losers they may
eventually influence decisionmaking in the long term more than illegitimate arguments that fall outside the playing field of permissible constitutional argumentation.
If we depart from the realm of the Supreme Court, but stay within
the realm of the judiciary, we might consider the voice with which this
book speaks to lower court judges and to the lawyers who argue before
them. Here the nature of the book becomes a bit more puzzling.
More specifically, one might expect a treatise to contain a moderately
comprehensive description of lower court cases. But although Tribe is
somewhat better at recognizing the relevance of lower court cases as
part of constitutional law than are most others who write comprehensively about the field, 12 this remains a book that concentrates overwhelmingly on Supreme Court decisions. In this respect it is not only
unlike Wigmore and Corbin, ·but even unlike some number of books
dealing with constitutional issues, perhaps most notably the unfortunately obsolete Emerson, Haber & Dorsen ~ Political and Civil Rights
in the United States. 13
This is not to suggest that Supreme Court decisions are unimportant to lower court judges or to lawyers who appear before them. On
the contrary, most arguments made by these lawyers are likely to be
interpretive judgments about Supreme Court cases, and thus an analysis of those cases will be highly useful. Still, however valuable this
book will be from that perspective, it may disappoint those who expect
a somewhat more comprehensive treatment of all or even most of the
relevant case law.
Conversely, the book is replete with references to the secondary
literature, primarily law review articles. Again, however, Tribe's goal
here does not appear to be to attain comprehensiveness, and the law10. On this process, see N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY (1978).
11. This raises a host of interesting complications. If this review had characterized the book
as dishonest junk (which is emphatically not what I believe), would I have diminished its authori·
tative status? What if a review written in the Harvard Law Review by Justice Brennan had said
the same thing? What about a review written in a local law review by a totally unknown begin·
ning academic? Are book reviews in law reviews themselves internal and not external, primacy
rather than secondacy? If (and a big "if" it is) a strongly negative review by me in this review
would have had a negative effect, then have I not done something internal by the vecy process of
not writing such a review?
12. See, e.g, pp. 972 n.9, 1050 n.27, 1184 n.38, 1324-25, 1363-70.
13. N. DORSEN, P. BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN'S POLITICAL
AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (4th ed. 1976).
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yer or judge seeking all or even most of the relevant literature will
have to look elsewhere. But a great deal of the most important literature is here, and usually not merely in "see also" form. Tribe actually
uses the secondary literature, often in the course of those many footnotes that are sufficiently incisive that they could provide the cores for
individual articles in their own right.
Yet for all of Tribe's references to Supreme Court cases, lower
court cases, and the secondary literature, it is hard to see this book as
a place to go to find out about other material. It is primarily a book
one would use to find an enormous array of short, prescriptive analyses on discrete constitutional problems. Lawyers and judges will find
those analyses useful as introductions to the areas they discuss, as creative perspectives on those areas, and as persuasively presented arguments for what Tribe thinks ought to be done. Most will want to start
with Tribe or at least include him in their thinking about these
problems. Few,, however, will find that this is the only source they
wish to consult.

v
All of this, of course, sounds just like how a scholar would use this
book - the scholar seeking an introduction to an area she has not
previously thought about, or a useful perspective on an area with
which she has some familiarity. When Tribe does not persuade, he at
least presents a worthwhile view of the problem he addresses. And for
those who wish that Tribe had paid more attention to the literature on
and debates about constitutional theory, let us not forget that this
book is a constitutional th~ory, perhaps at times not presented in the
professional language of constitutional theorists, but presented instead
in 1778 pages of demonstrating the theory at work. 14
Once we see that this book speaks to the scholar in almost the
same voice as it speaks to the lawy~r and to the judge, can we still say
that it is a part of corn~titutional law rather than a book about it? I
think we can, precisely because of the way "Tribe on Constitutional
Law" embodies many of the conventions of constitutional law as practiced both by lawyers and by academics.
First, the scope of the book is defined by the topics that are considered part of the subject called "Constitutional Law" in American law
14. The theory that emerges, however, may be insufficiently internally coherent for the practicing constitutional theorist. At times Tribe's positions seem not to fit together, and at times
arguments he uses in one area are strangely absent from others. But this may demonstrate that
his theory is simultaneously a theory of activism and of comparatively particularized approaches
to particular problems. Given the way constitutional decisionmaking operates within a particularized world, given the way the problems of today are not those of yesterday or tomorrow, and
given the multiplicity of constitutional decisionmakers, it is apparent that Tribe's diffuse analysis
of all constitutional problems is a theory of how constitutional decisionmaking does and should
operate in a hardly unitary world.
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schools. This subject, however, is but a subset of what might be called
"Constitutional Law" in any other context. The book excludes constitutional criminal procedure, constitutional civil procedure, and the
constitutional aspects of a wide variety of subjects covered in other law
school classes. Moreover, as I have said, the book's treatment of
Supreme Court cases and the secondary literature is far heavier than
its treatment of lower court cases, and it is addressed far more to the
lawyer or the judge than to other governmental decisionmakers. But
finally, and most importantly, the book reflects existing constitutional
conventions by conflating the very distinction I drew at the outset of
this review. It is written by someone who is simultaneously a major
constitutional scholar at a leading American law school, the preeminent constitutional litigator in the country, and a widely known public
commentator on constitutional issues. The book's description is glued
to its prescription, such that almost all of what the book contains is, in
one way or another, an argument for an approach that American
courts, especially the Supreme Court, ought to adopt. Tribe speaks as
a participant in the system, and uses, almost exclusively, the methods
of the lawyer to comment on the law. And if at times perspectives
from other disciplines, whether history or philosophy or economics,
creep in, then that too is what we would ·expect in today's world of
constitutional law.
Because it is addressed to the constitutional scholar as much as to
the constitutional lawyer or judge, and because its author is both a
practitioner of and a commentator on the discipline, this book represents and comments on a domain in which the distinction between the
internal and the external, between the participant and the observer,
has collapsed. In the final analysis, this book exists within constitutional law, not at an angle to it. It is a masterful exercise in a tradition, and it embodies in many respects the best of that tradition. Yet
the book also ought to be taken as a warning, a warning about what
the discipline is becoming. If academic institutions have value, it is in
part because they are at an angle to society, and at an angle to the
phenomenon they wish to explain. Their virtue exists in their ability
to say those things that cannot be said by more immediately accountable primary participants. But if the distinction between the participant
and the observer collapses, and the observer aspires to have her observations taken into account by today's decisionmakers, there may be no
room for those who would stand outside, willing to exchange immediate impact for long-term understanding.
The phenomenon I describe may be lessening. The interdisciplinary nature of much of contemporary legal scholarship, for example,
makes it less likely that our words will be directed to or heard by those
whose primary expertise is in, and only in, law. Moreover, I can say
with some confidence that the Supreme Court in 1991 will be further
politically from the constitutional professoriate in 1991 than the
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Supreme Court was from the constitutional professoriate in 1968. If
the Justices are less inclined to listen, maybe constitutional scholars
will be less inclined to talk directly to them.
None of this is to fault Tribe or the spectacular accomplishment
his book represents. "Tribe on Constitutional Law" represents a world
in which, in one form or another, and for better or for worse, the mode
of the scholar/participant is overwhelming. That mode has its place,
and maybe even the major place. But when it is difficult to separate
the discipline from commentary on it, when it is difficult to separate
the players from the critics, something is lost. It is not lost to constitutional law now, for the practice of constitutional law has been greatly
enriched by academic input. That enrichment, though, may have
come at some expense to the ideal of the academy, for without the
external perspective the ability to say those things that cannot otherwise be said is lost. This book is a masterwork of a perspective that is
largely internal to the practice it seeks to explain and justify. But as
such, it is also a warning to a discipline that may not recognize that
the internal is not the only perspective there can be.

